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 1 
European Integration by Daylight 
 
Jonathan White 
 
White, Jonathan (2010), ‘European integration by daylight’, 
Comparative European Politics, 8 (1). 55-73. ISSN 1472-4790 
 
 
It has become common to highlight the desirability of a more ‘politicised’ EU so as to counter the low visibility 
of its policy-making and the disaffection this may breed.  Endorsing this view, the article argues existing 
contributions to the topic tend to give insufficient attention to the relationship between institutional settings and 
everyday life, and to underplay the significance of how political actors interpret and reproduce the social and 
political world.  The article explores how one might reconsider these questions, drawing on some of the insights 
of cultural and pragmatic sociology to suggest that the important obstacles to further politicisation may be 
rooted in contemporary political culture.  A contribution is thereby intended both to the topic in question and to 
a wider effort to supplement institutional perspectives in EU studies with those drawn from sociology.
1
  
 
 
‘Politicisation’ has become a term used widely in EU studies, an organising theme even.  Sometimes 
the intended meaning is descriptive, as in the observation that the Brussels institutions have accrued 
responsibilities extending well beyond the socio-economic tasks of market creation (the latter 
understood as non-political), or that matters European have become controversial in the domestic 
politics of  EU member-states (Hooghe & Marks 2008) (van der Eijk & Franklin 2004).  Just as 
often it is understood as a goal.  Politicisation in this sense is advanced as a remedy for a Union in 
malaise – a malaise originating in the way policy-making is pursued and the way citizens respond to 
it (Hix 2008).  These meanings are clearly entwined, but this article accepts the focus of the latter.  
At its core therefore is a political-theoretical concern, not just an empirical puzzle. 
  The common thread of these more normative approaches to politicisation is the desirability 
of EU policy-making being further subject to contestation.
2
  In a political system where non-elected 
institutions heavily inform policy-making, the practices of government take on a technocratic 
character that tends to conceal the value choices embedded in decision-making (Tsakatika 2007).  
That the public good might be a matter for clashing and competing interpretations, and that this 
might be essential to democratic politics, is commonly pushed to one side, either on the grounds that 
there exists a broad consensus on the objectives of policy-making, or with the notion that the 
‘effectiveness’ of outcomes would be unacceptably harmed if dissenting views were acknowledged 
and engaged at each stage.  Integration is in this sense ‘by stealth’ (Hayward 1996).  Some may treat 
this as a matter of concern outright, and one can pursue an explicitly evaluative line of reasoning that 
seeks to show why such a set-up is undesirable and why politicisation is intrinsically of worth.  Such 
                                                 
1
 Comments on an earlier draft were kindly offered by Volker Balli, Lea Ypi, Virginie van Ingelgom and fellow 
participants in the sociology workshop at the 2008 ECPR Joint Sessions in Rennes.  The author additionally 
thanks the editors responsible for this issue, two anonymous referees who helped improve the piece, and the 
Alexander von Humboldt Stiftung for funding a research fellowship at the Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin. 
2
 Such approaches are based on an adversarialist conception of democracy; its normative appeal is beyond the scope of 
this article, but a good introduction is (Muirhead 2006). 
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an approach extends the ‘normative turn’ experienced in EU studies from the mid-1990s, in which 
the EU’s compatibility with democratic norms has been assiduously probed (Bellamy & Castiglione 
2003) (Chryssochoou 2000).
3
  Much of the existing literature on politicisation instead adopts a 
scientific perspective, arguing that the current arrangement has a negative effect on citizen attitudes 
towards the EU, and thus that politicisation is instrumentally relevant to the sustainability of 
European integration.  To synthesise a number of arguments, the thesis is as follows: since the 
current EU regime offers few opportunities for organised political opposition, and those which exist 
have traditionally been weakly structured along partisan lines, citizens who are dissatisfied with 
events in Brussels have only the options either to disengage from political developments altogether, 
or to oppose the very idea of a European polity (Mair 2007).  For a minimum of consent to appear 
one would instead need to see adversarial debate over opposing political programmes, for only then 
would it be possible for dissent to be expressed towards EU policies without this entailing a rejection 
of the polity outright (Hix 2008).
4
  To be sure, even a politicised regime might ultimately come to be 
rejected, on grounds unrelated to the substance of its political programmes, but such an outcome 
would express greater nuance and democratic clarity than existing conditions permit.  European 
integration, one may summarise, suffers if it lingers in the shadows. 
Contributions to this topic tend to give some accent to the significance of views and 
practices beyond the Brussels institutions.  The significance of public opinion, as something wider 
than the interplay between decision-makers and a small number of interest groups, is emphasised as 
a relevant factor in the EU’s development (Hooghe & Marks 2008), whether on purely empirical 
grounds or normative grounds also.  To a degree then, the advent of the politicisation problematic in 
EU studies already marks something of an endorsement of sociological lines of thought on the EU 
(de Wilde 2007).  If one can accept that a turn towards the wider European population(s) marks a 
shift towards the study of ‘society’, already one might want to speak circumspectly of a ‘sociological 
turn’, rather in the spirit of this special issue.  However, such a turn has so far been cursory.  There 
remains a need to study more closely not so much the behaviour of political representatives in 
Brussels but the extent to which citizens more widely attribute significance to this behaviour, and are 
invited to do so by the schemes of interpretation on which they draw.  Moreover, there is a need to 
rethink more generally the nature of the relationship between political actors and society, and to 
introduce a more reflexive and less functional conception of actors such as the political party.   
As will be argued, insofar as sociology can enrich this discussion, it requires that one resist 
reducing it to what some may consider its disciplinary core – the search for regularities of behaviour 
and the elaboration of non-individualist explanations for these – but that one treat it as a pluralistic 
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 For the purposes of this article, let us set aside those who fear it may prove unfeasible to politicise the substance of EU 
policy-making – its political ends – without politicising the procedures by which these are sought (Bartolini 2006).  
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discipline in which certain strands may be more appropriate to given tasks than others.  The article 
therefore discusses the kinds of sociology that should be brought into discussions of politicisation, 
and seeks to undermine an image of sociology either as consciously disengaged from questions of 
political theory, or as so intent on causal explanation that little theoretical space is preserved for the 
exercise of creative agency.  The merits of an interpretative political sociology are advanced, and 
some lines of empirical investigation centred on the language and imagery of political action 
described.  Indication is thereby given of how one might study the politico-cultural factors likely to 
influence the success of efforts to expose European integration to greater scrutiny and debate.  
 
 
Rethinking Politicisation 
 
Much of the existing literature on the EU’s politicisation proceeds from a focus on the decision-
making of its institutions, principally (though not solely) the behaviour of representatives in the 
European Parliament.
5
  It is supposed that if parties in the Parliament are able to consolidate 
themselves by strengthening their organisational structures, forming stable coalitions with one 
another, and displaying consistent voting behaviour amongst their members, then a clear set of 
electoral choices will emerge which the voting public can engage with and thereby develop 
confidence in the EU as a political arena.  The Parliament would then be in a position to push for 
greater powers vis-à-vis the other Brussels institutions and to subject more areas of policy-making to 
parliamentary scrutiny, thus moving closer to the politicisation of the ‘governance practices’ of the 
EU.  Accordingly, empirical studies have looked at the stability of party groups in the Parliament, 
the extent to which these regulate the voting preferences of representatives, and how far the relative 
distribution of these preferences is consistent with their supposed distribution in the populations of 
the EU member-states.  Researchers have conducted a series of sophisticated analyses of the voting 
patterns of MEPs seeking to establish whether a left-right axis can plausibly be projected onto their 
behaviour (Hix 2008) (Hix 2002), or whether new lines of contestation have emerged (Hooghe & 
Marks 2008).   
  Given that the premise for discussion is that many citizens are disconnected from, or hostile 
to, the processes of EU politics, this focus on the European Parliament may seem a suspect point of 
departure.  Important as it is to examine whether conflict between political representatives is in some 
way structured, and whether those structures match those ostensibly found in the wider populations 
of EU member-states, this can hardly be the basis for a full account of politicisation.  For even if one 
were able to show a numerical correspondence between political structuring at the ‘elite’ and the 
‘mass’ level, whereby political groupings such as left and right were equally represented in each, this 
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would not be sufficient to indicate an active relation between the two.  One would want to know not 
just whether there is adversarial debate taking place in Brussels that is consistent with wider political 
alignments, but whether such debate has public resonance.  Specifically, one would want to know 
more about the extent to which citizens are aware of the conflicts taking place in Brussels, and the 
extent to which they look to them spontaneously as ‘their’ conflicts – i.e. conflicts in which they 
themselves are subjects, rather than just disputes between obscure and/or foreign elites.  One would 
also be interested in the extent to which they see the policies these conflicts lead to as meaningful for 
their own experiences.  Matters of perception are crucial.  As or more important than whether 
political actors adapt, as organisations, to the new ‘political opportunity structure’ the EU offers to 
them (Beyers and Kerremans 2004) is the social meaning attributed to the conflicts they engage in.   
  This need not be an argument for the superiority of ‘bottom-up’ over ‘top-down’ 
approaches to the EU.  While some sociologists favour this language (Favell 2006), it is misleading 
if taken to imply a separation of spheres (e.g. the political and the social, or the elites and masses) or 
a direction of causal dependence.
6
  There is no reason to accord a priority of ontology to the views 
and experiences of ordinary citizens over those of their political representatives, since arguably some 
political actors – political parties at the national level, for instance – may have a critical role to play 
in shaping common understandings and perceptions rather than simply responding to existing ones.  
Parties need not be thought of as passive mechanisms of representation, any more than lay citizens 
are a passive audience to their activities.  The key point is not that one should focus more on the 
‘bottom’ than the ‘top’, but that one needs to focus on the relations that exist or do not exist across 
the various sites of activity. 
  This connects to a second demand, which is to avoid the temptation to conceptualise 
political reality in terms of given, pre-political elements.  Most of the existing literature adopts an 
aggregative perspective on politics, whereby political outcomes are decided by changes in the 
quantitative distribution of certain units, whether these be ‘interests’, ‘preferences’, or, in more 
constructivist approaches, ‘identities’ and ‘values’.  Public opinion tends to be conceived as the sum 
total of these given elements, and politics as what happens after they have made their appearance on 
the scene; after, for instance, preferences have been ‘revealed’.  Political parties are understood 
accordingly as the means by which these pre-existing units are aggregated and promoted in conflict 
with those who oppose them, enabling them to be represented proportionately in the legislative 
chamber and, after a process of bargaining, to exert due influence on the course of policy-making 
(Lord 2006).  What tends to be given insufficient attention is the significance of the process by 
which these units are formed (or in some cases left ill-defined), and the combination of constraints 
and possibilities for political conflict this opens out. 
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  Take for example cleavage theory, a common analytical perspective in the EU literature 
which sees the emergence of political preferences as a function of societal cleavages, notably those 
based on class, religion, and centre-periphery relations.  In the classic rendition, such divisions are 
understood to be highly stable or ‘frozen’ (Lipset and Rokkan 1967), while in more recent accounts 
some emphasis is placed on the gradual emergence of new cleavages resulting from the shift to post-
industrial society (Marks, Wilson and Ray 2002).  The politicisation of the EU thus involves politics 
at the European level coming to be structured by these societal cleavages.  Such an approach has a 
certain appeal, in that it keeps focus on the substantive ends around which political conflict takes 
place, something that may be a key factor in its wider resonance.  Yet it neglects the extent to which 
societal cleavages are susceptible to purposeful redescription.  Political actors arguably have a 
decisive role in interpreting the social and political world, and thereby elaborating the terms on 
which political conflict takes place.  Their decisions are an important influence on which images of 
society are maintained and reproduced, which fall out of currency, and which new ones emerge.  The 
danger of a cleavage-based perspective is that it downplays these choice-laden and potentially 
creative interventions.7  It tends instead towards a kind of ‘groupism’: citizens come to be seen 
primarily as a function of their background – as the bearers of economic and socio-cultural structure, 
whether in the form of ‘interests’ or ‘identities’.  Equally problematically, political conflict comes to 
be conceived in sedimented and dualistic terms without sensitivity to the ongoing possibilities for its 
transformation.
8
   
  Aggregation of some kind is always likely to be a central feature of democracy, given the 
importance of voting and the principle of majority rule.  But some of the most politically significant 
developments occur well before the moment of aggregation, in the constitution of the field in 
question.  A richer account of politicisation requires that one look into the formation of 
‘preferences’, and further that one do this in ways that avoid reifying certain social divisions and 
associated social groupings.  One needs to keep open, and make the subject of study, the 
construction of the constituencies to which political actors appeal and the ends which they seek to 
promote on their behalf.   
  This may be particularly so for two reasons.  First, one of the widely observed tendencies 
in contemporary democracies is the rise of electoral instability, i.e. the decreasing willingness of 
citizens to display blind loyalty to one party but to reconsider their attachments from one election to 
the next, and for parties likewise to target new voters.  Socio-cultural cleavages seem to be 
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decreasingly reliable as a guide to voting behaviour and party politics (Mair 2008).  This should 
already alert us to the potential importance of more interpretative perspectives which make fewer 
assumptions about the nature of social ties and their implications for political action.  But second, 
also the peculiarities of the transnational context invite one to be particularly sensitive to departures 
from the conventional socio-cultural groupings.  Adversarial political conflicts at a European level, 
insofar as they develop, are likely to entail the emergence of new forms of collective identification, 
new ways of understanding collective interests, and new narratives that invoke the EU as a plausible 
means to address shared political problems.  When studying the prospects for the EU’s politicisation, 
one needs to be particularly sensitive then to how the social and political world is interpreted and re-
interpreted – and thereby changed, transformed or reproduced – and the factors influencing this.   
  Rethinking how one theorises politicisation is likely to require rethinking the methods by 
which it is empirically researched.  Much of the work on this subject relies on data drawn from 
opinion polls and voting records, whether centred on party representatives or lay citizens.  These 
techniques seem insufficient for a number of reasons.  First, they sit uneasily with the starting 
assumption that large numbers of citizens are weakly engaged in the activities of the EU.  If this is 
so, opinion polls are likely to tap rather superficial opinions, while voting data will inevitably report 
on the behaviour only of an active and engaged minority (cf. the low percentages that vote in 
European elections).  These are problems essential to the method: polls necessarily direct the 
respondent’s attention towards the topic of research interest, and are therefore always liable to inflate 
the respondent’s level of concern with it.  Rather than asking people for their opinions on ‘Europe’ 
and the EU, and classing responses with cluster-terms such as ‘euro-scepticism’, what is needed are 
studies that explore the extent to which these form natural reference-points in people’s everyday 
lives.  One needs methods that can study dis-engagement and in-action, i.e. the behaviour of a silent 
majority.   
  Second, polling methods are ill-suited to studying matters of interpretation and the 
ideational world, which are central to the study of political conflict.  Polls are designed to aggregate 
succinct items of information which can then be analysed for patterns of correlation and compared 
across time and space: hence the focus on responses to short-answer questioning.  If, on the other 
hand, one wants to study people’s level of involvement in political conflict and the extent to which 
they feel implicated in its outcome, one will want to examine a whole series of complex issues to do 
with how they understand the nature of politics and political agency, how far they connect problems 
in everyday life to wider struggles, how they define the ‘we’ who is engaged in these struggles, and 
how far they see these problems as susceptible to collective address.  Likewise when looking at 
organised political actors, one will be interested not simply in whether labels such as ‘left’ or ‘right’ 
can be feasibly attached to certain individuals, nor even whether those individuals themselves accept 
such labels, but in the deeper patterns of assumption in which such concepts are enmeshed, and 
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which enable and constrain the engagement in adversarial politics.  Crucially, these are all aspects of 
tacit understanding, part of the taken-for-granted practical knowledge that structures behaviour and 
the formation of opinions.  Opinion-poll researchers do not engage in the in-depth probing required 
to uncover these tacit aspects – this is not goal they set themselves – and therefore an alternative, 
more interpretative set of methods is likely to be necessary.  As will be indicated below, certain 
ethnographic approaches developed in political sociology are of particular relevance here.  
 
    
Towards an Interpretative Political Sociology 
 
So far little has been said about the need for more ‘sociological’ perspectives and the kind of 
sociology which might be required.  Perhaps from the perspective of a student of politics this will 
seem natural enough: other disciplines tend to seem more homogeneous than one’s own, and many 
political scientists may feel they have a good sense of what a ‘sociological account’ would entail.  
But this may be because the penetration of political study by sociology has so far been limited to a 
rather narrow range of sociological ideas.  By far the most common appropriations have been from 
Talcott Parsons’ structural functionalism, leading to a large number of political-scientific works 
whose sociological component is an emphasis on norms and values (Favell 2005).  This represents of 
course just a small fraction of sociology’s intellectual resources, and arguably one which is 
disconnected from contemporary social-theoretical developments (Reckwitz 2002).  Moreover, they 
may be amongst the least appropriate for incorporation into political study.  The figure of homo 
sociologicus as the passive follower of law-like norms and the unreflexive creature of values seems 
remote indeed from the ideas of human freedom that underpin even the most minimalist 
understanding of democracy.  A sociology whose prime concern is with the identification of 
behavioural regularities, and which therefore has determinist implications, is likely to fit awkwardly 
with research that has a political-theoretical dimension.  Particularly a research field such as the 
present one, to do with the polity-forming effects of adversarial conflict, resists combination with 
such a perspective, given that collective political struggle involves a critical disposition towards the 
status quo and a degree of reflexivity about the ends worthy of pursuit.   
  Some of the more promising work may instead be found in recent contributions to cultural 
and pragmatic sociology (Lamont and Thévenot 2000) (Boltanski and Thévenot 2006) (Sewell 
2005).  At the most general level, the appeal of these approaches lies in their combined attention to, 
on the one hand, the macro features of the symbolic world which lay down certain parameters to 
what people are able and willing to do, and which encourage certain courses of action over others, 
and on the other hand the possibilities which remain open to individuals in specific situations to 
exert some level of choice in their actions and thereby to influence and reshape those same social 
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structures.  The notion of ‘cultural availability’ is used to give a sense of both structure and agency 
without prioritising one to the exclusion of the other, and without parcelling up the social world into 
neatly defined groups marked by high levels of internal homogeneity.  The result is a perspective 
which avoids an a-sociological tendency to voluntarism, since it is recognised that actors proceed 
from a limited range of ideational resources, yet which also allows space for interpretation and 
creativity, and thus the exercise of political will – two prerequisites of an adequate approach to a 
topic such as politicisation.   
  Moreover, to a greater degree than earlier formulations of the duality of structure, these 
approaches translate well into programmes for empirical research.  As several works have indicated, 
the study of symbolic boundaries, cultural repertoires, orders of worth, discursive practices, and 
modes of justification and critique, can be brought together with rich results (Lamont and Thévenot 
2000) (Boltanski and Chiapello 2006) (Lamont and Molnár 2002).  In one notable instance, using as 
case-studies two environmental disputes in France and the US, Laurent Thévenot and his co-authors 
examine the varied logics of argumentation actors pursue when seeking to justify their political 
positions and the wider cultural patterns these express.  As part of their findings, they show how 
participants to dispute generally seek to ground their views by appealing to the public good, and that 
how they construe this good varies in culturally significant ways.  Actors show a marked tendency to 
evoke certain evaluative registers and forms of evidence more frequently than others: in the US case 
(more so than the French one), market-based conceptions of worth are regularly offered, backed by 
cost-benefit data emphasising the potential revenue and economic growth offered by a certain course 
of action and the dubious worth of opposing proposals.  How this register of evaluation comes to be 
matched against alternative ones also differs across settings: in the one, a market-based notion of 
worth comes to be articulated with civic and green notions, as public opinion and environmental 
sustainability are invoked as supporting ideas, while in the other market values are regarded as 
antithetical to these notions and explicitly criticised from such viewpoints (Thévenot, Moody and 
Lafaye 2000).  The study provides a rich empirical indication of how political actors may deploy 
cultural resources to pragmatic effect in the micro situation while at the same time exhibiting 
dispositions that are ordered at the macro level.  While presented as a cross-national comparison, its 
more general significance lies in highlighting the role played by prevalent structures of meaning in 
shaping the forms that political conflict takes.  Interpretative research methods such as these offer 
good possibilities for combination with established approaches inspired by ethnographers such as 
Erving Goffman (frame analysis in particular) and with the wide range of textualist approaches 
inspired by the philosophy of Austin and the later Wittgenstein. 
  How might such ideas be brought to bear on the study of political conflict in the EU?  First 
they are suggestive of how one might re-conceptualise the conditions for politicisation.  Adopting 
the idea of cultural availability, one can propose that political adversarialism at a European level 
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requires the widespread availability in EU populations of those ideational resources that can ‘make 
sense’ of the EU as a political arena and invite citizens to participate in efforts to influence its 
political agenda.  Amongst such elements will be, for instance, basic assumptions about the 
existence of political problems in need of address; ways of seeing these problems (e.g. their origins 
and their effects) such that proposals to tackle them at a specifically European level can be made to 
seem justifiable; and certain forms of collective identification which cut across national boundaries 
and thereby give meaning to political conflict at a transnational level.  Such elements need not be 
cognitivised and treated as the properties of specific individuals (as beliefs, identities, personal 
values, etc.), but can be seen as repertoires commonly available to them as part of the social world 
they inhabit.   
  Second, these social-theoretical ideas point to how any advance in politicisation will 
depend on the ability of actors in society to elaborate and diffuse new ideational resources of the 
kind described.  One may suppose this type of innovation is most likely amongst those who are 
politically organised, who command media attention and have the opportunity to lend governmental 
authority to their ideas – amongst the activists who make up national political parties, social 
movements and certain think-tanks, for example.  Yet seeing politicisation as ultimately a matter of 
discursive innovation allows one to avoid a purely institutional focus, and the attendant separation of 
the social and political spheres, since one need make no overarching assumption about the lesser 
significance of other sites of activity.  Furthermore, this perspective allows one to sidestep the 
tendency towards a groupist ontology: not only can one avoid seeing the basis of political conflict in 
terms of fixed social configurations ordered by material determinants in the manner of cleavage 
theory, but one can also see the protagonists themselves as complex ideational constellations rather 
than bounded social units.  Parties and social movements, for example, can be treated not so much as 
unitary actors whose behaviour is structured by clearly defined organisational interests, but as 
evolving compromises between different sets of symbolic boundaries and evaluative registers, the 
different elements of which may come to the fore differently in the particular situation. 
  Third, this perspective directs attention towards the constraints on those who would seek to 
introduce and promote the kind of innovation described.  It suggests these constraints may consist 
not so much in unambiguous social facts but in the ways the social and political world comes to be 
represented and experienced (Lamont and Thévenot 2000).  One may suppose that the ability of 
politically motivated citizens such as movement activists to re-imagine the social and political world, 
and thus engage in adversarial politics to promote new ways of conceiving it, is limited by the 
ideational conditions in which they find themselves.  For like all citizens they operate within a field 
of sedimented meanings and taken-for-granted ideas – a field that depends largely on their choices 
for its reproduction, but one constraining to the individual actor nonetheless.  The ability to articulate 
challenges to the status quo – the essence of politicisation – depends on the availability of vantage-
 10 
points in this field from which to develop critiques (Boltanski and Chiapello 2006).  At risk of 
overstating its uniformity, one might speak of this field as the political culture such actors inhabit.  
Not the least of its sources will be the successful ideational initiatives of other political actors past 
and present, whose achievements determine their point of departure.  
  A common objection to perspectives such as these is that they are insufficiently attentive to 
the non-symbolic forms of social structure apt to bear on political action just as much as does the 
distribution of ‘repertoires’, ideational resources, and the like.  The way in which, for instance, 
economic, institutional and legal structures relate to structures of symbolic practice is arguably 
under-explored in these approaches, notwithstanding some of the positive consequences of this 
neglect – notably that the space for political agency is not closed prematurely – and notwithstanding 
the fact that it need not deprive these approaches of their potential relevance to social and political 
critique (Silber 2003).  Sociologists in the Bourdieusian tradition will want to know more about the 
kinds of social structure which grant added authority to the efforts of some actors to order and 
capitalise on the symbolic world, and about the kinds of influence bound up in the properties of the 
speaker (Bourdieu 1991).  Such concerns need not however trigger a return to the familiar array of 
sociological approaches which set up a hierarchy of structures and make it axiomatic that the 
symbolic-ideational is determined by factors external to it.  Instead, what is needed is the study of 
the interplay between material and symbolic aspects of reality in the particular moment.  Asserting 
that the structures of the ideational world are never fully determined by institutional, legal and 
economic structures by no means precludes the examination of how, in given historical instances, 
changes in the latter may open up or narrow down the possibilities for change in the former 
(Thévenot, Moody and Lafaye 2000).  Moments of political and economic crisis, whether in the 
extreme cases of war, revolution and economic catastrophe, or in the more prosaic cases of political 
scandal and economic uncertainty, may be when understandings of the social and political world are 
most susceptible to change.
9
  Ideational structures may thus be ‘disciplined’ by changes in the 
material world without being sharply determined by them.   
 
 
Some Lines of Empirical Research 
 
There are a number of research projects which might proceed from these reflections.  The first would 
be to study the extent to which, in the sense outlined, contemporary EU politics can be judged as 
(de)politicised.  An existing line of research has examined for instance the degree to which ordinary 
citizens recognise problems needing public address, the extent to which they see political institutions 
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as a plausible means to tackle them, and how far they invoke the EU as the relevant political arena.  
A tendency to evoke ‘problems without solutions’ suggests the ideational resources required to make 
sense of political conflict and political agency may be somewhat lacking, and the ensuing political 
fatalism poses a challenge for political authority at the national as well as the European level (White 
2009) (White, 2010 b).  A second field of study would look at some of the obstacles that exist to the 
emergence of more positive ideational resources.  Principled euro-scepticism is undoubtedly one: 
those opposed to the idea of a European polity clearly have no incentive to make available the kinds 
of perspective that would support it.  In other cases, insights can undoubtedly be drawn from some 
of the existing accounts of politicisation that point either to the internal dynamics of parties (Ladrech 
2007), to the incentives created by the allocation of institutional competences within the EU regime 
(Lord 2006), or to the constraints posed by existing ideational commitments developed within the 
context of the nation-state (Bartolini 2005).  But, drawing on the sociological approaches outlined 
above, it should be possible to identify further factors of significance to do with key features of 
contemporary European political culture.  Without pre-empting its systematic study, one might point 
to a few sensitising ideas as follows.   
  First, it has been widely noted that political debate has come to be played out in the 
language and imagery of the individual.  Parties, for instance, are styled increasingly around 
individual personalities rather than programmatic ideas: the projected image of party leaders – their 
supposed strength of character, their personal beliefs, their ‘back-story’ – becomes the key elements 
in the party ‘brand’, resulting in a trend towards so-called ‘celebrity politics’ (Meyer and Hinchman 
2002).  Parties tend increasingly also to articulate their constituency in atomised terms (as the tax-
payer, the consumer, etc.) rather than as one or several collective agents.
10
  Collective forms of 
subjecthood, such as those based on left and right, are deployed less frequently, and more weakly 
connected to distinctive political programmes (Furedi 2005).  While political groupings based on left 
and right may persist as organisational denominations and intellectual constructs, they may slowly 
be being emptied of their wider resonance (a trend which, gradual and even temporary though it may 
be, is another reason to be sceptical of studies of politicisation centred mainly on the voting patterns 
of political representatives).  Importantly, the decision to adopt such strategies is in no sense 
inevitable: arguably they are induced not so much by the demands of modern politics, the modern 
media, or by processes of globalisation, but by the assumptions which partisans and others make of 
these (Meyer and Hinchman 2002).  The outcome is that political debate comes to be ‘starved’ of the 
collective forms of identification needed for will-formation and the advance of political claims.  
Political sociologists have observed that one of the crucial stimuli to political engagement on the part 
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 Cf. for instance debates in European countries from 2007 onwards concerning whether to guarantee the survival of 
private banks with public funds: the key question was repeatedly framed as ‘will the taxpayer get their money back?’  
Such formulations individualise the public, and emphasise the constraints and burdens that fall on individuals rather than 
a wider public, as well as positioning these individuals as passive spectators of developments elsewhere. 
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of citizens is the availability of a sense of ‘we’ who must act collectively to counter the political 
demands of ‘them’ (Gamson 1992).  One may suppose that where mainstream parties fail to 
articulate a sense of collective political subjecthood and to affirm the possibility of collective action, 
citizens are likely either to become decreasingly politically engaged (perhaps seeking an ethnic form 
of collectivity which makes no claim on the political scene, or restricting their engagement to single-
issue campaigns) or, as one sees frequently in contemporary European politics, to be attracted by 
those so-called populist parties which do construct their constituencies in collective terms (as ‘the 
people’), albeit in anti-democratic ways such that the established political system itself is positioned 
as the adversary.  Lacking suitable modes of subjecthood, democratic forms of critique become 
difficult to articulate.  Clearly the impact of such trends is likely to be felt on politics at the national 
just as much as the EU level, but they may be especially damaging in the context of a political arena 
requiring the formation of cross-national collective allegiances.
11
    
  A further idea of importance is the thesis that contemporary European politics is 
increasingly played out in a moral register (Mouffe 2005) or a technocratic register (Burnham 2001) 
rather than a political one.  There is a tendency, in other words, for political choices to be framed and 
justified in absolute terms (‘right vs wrong’, ‘sensible vs nonsensical’, ‘efficient vs inefficient’) 
rather than in terms which accept the possibility of reasonable disagreement, again as in the sense of 
right vs left.
12
  One may think of it as a disavowal of the conditions which make partisanship 
necessary, and it has evident consequences for the vitality of political adversarialism.  First, when 
this way of thinking becomes prevalent amongst those with governmental authority, it may lead to 
transfers of decision-making powers to non-majoritarian institutions, since the necessity of political 
debate may be overlooked and political disagreement may come to seem unreasonable.
13
  Rather 
than acknowledging plural and potentially conflicting conceptions of worth which must be 
adjudicated in the political process, a consensual model will prevail, supporting an institutional 
regime rather like the present EU where, formally at least, the potential for political conflict to 
inform policy-making in certain areas is quite constrained.
14
  Second – and perhaps even more 
significant, given that such institutional transfers are reversible and tend anyway to leave 
considerable powers in the hands of politicians – is the depoliticising effect this way of framing 
politics may have on citizens themselves.  Technocratic policy-making tends to rely on language 
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 Note that such trends may be particularly pronounced in the EU context, given the EU’s reliance on rights-based 
legislation addressed to the individual, e.g. as ‘consumer’ or ‘patient’ (Chalmers 2009). 
12
 Cultural dualisms such as ‘moderate vs extreme’ also exert a limiting effect here, implying dissenting perspectives are 
dubious simply because in relative terms they are radical. 
13
 Such transfers may be further encouraged by a separate widely-disseminated leitmotif: that narrow self-interest is the 
principal motivation of the ‘political class’ – cf. (Hay 2007). 
14
 Analogously to the US case described in (Thévenot, Moody and Lafaye 2000), one could expect not just that one 
evaluative register comes to prevail (most likely that of the market) but also the expectation that its relationship with 
other registers (e.g. those associated with environmentalism and citizenship) is a harmonious one.  Though such views 
may remain contested at the margins, they nevertheless undermine one of the important bases for political contestation: 
critique of one register by the logic of another. 
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unintelligible beyond a small circle of experts, generating mysteriousness about the logic it follows 
and the ends it serves, and dulling the critiques which might be made of it.
15
  Further, when political 
elites adopt these moral or technocratic modes of evaluation, they discourage other citizens from 
sensing the necessity of political engagement: those who become convinced that they are ‘right’ and 
that all competing perspectives are either ‘mad’ or ‘bad’ will see little reason why they should press 
a political claim in support of their views, since it will seem that history is on their side and only 
patience is required.  Politics in a moral or technocratic register tends to be coupled with a sense of 
the inevitable, and this is likely to encourage political withdrawal.
16
  Times of crisis may be 
particularly worthy of study here: on the one hand it is in such moments that orthodoxies are 
questioned and that claims to know the right answers may be weakened, yet on the other this is when 
deterministic arguments appealing to immovable material constraints are most fervently advanced. 
  Finally, an important influence on how politics comes to be articulated, and the extent to 
which adversarialism is engaged in, will be the meanings commonly attached to key concepts in the 
vocabulary of political actors.  The patterns of language usage they encounter will encourage certain 
interpretations of the social and political world over others, in turn shaping what these actors project 
onto the wider society and the political programmes they are able to justify to citizens.  The concept 
of ‘freedom’ – central to the political language of all democracies – is an interesting case in point.  
Contemporary political philosophers distinguish between different conceptions of liberty, sometimes 
termed liberal ‘non-interference’, communitarian ‘self-mastery’, and republican ‘non-domination’ 
(Pettit 1997).  It is generally observed that, while there have been historical settings in which each 
has had a degree of pre-eminence, in contemporary western democracies the first of these meanings 
tends to dominate.  It is, amongst other things, a master-element in the contemporary ‘spirit of 
capitalism’ (Boltanski and Chiapello 2006).  This is likely to have implications for the politicisation 
of an EU polity long defined by its ‘four freedoms’ (Dobson 2004).  Liberty as non-interference 
appeals to the personal freedom of the individual to proceed with his/her affairs unimpeded as far as 
possible by external, human-imposed obstacles.  It forms the basis for constitutional rights, and is 
therefore an important component in the self-understanding of any democratic regime; yet taken on 
its own it offers little prospect for conjuring a sense of collective political subjecthood amongst 
citizens, and is liable to render most forms of governmental intervention initially suspect.  Those 
who adopt this conception of liberty will then probably incline towards a minimalist understanding 
of the EU as an area of free movement rather than seek to encourage citizens to influence its political 
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 Cf. the Bank of England’s proposals on ‘quantitative easing’ in spring 2009, a term picked up widely in media 
coverage of the economic crisis but hardly likely to elucidate its origins or possible remedies.  Obfuscation can of course 
be strategic. 
16
 The moralising of political debate may also lead to a heightened concern with personal hypocrisy: whether an 
individual is morally entitled to make a certain argument, based on their actions or other statements, may come to seem 
more deserving of attention than the substance of the argument itself.  Thus it may be decided for example that the most 
salient feature of a climate-change conference is the carbon footprints of the conference attendees.  The ideas-based 
politics necessary for meaningful political conflict again becomes weakened. 
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agenda.  It is the emphasis on freedom as self-mastery or non-domination which may better invite 
politicisation, since then collective political claims aimed at achieving such freedoms are likely to 
better resonate.  But insofar as the one type of usage is encountered more than its alternatives, the 
ideological work required to reshape the concept’s meaning rather than reproduce it will be all the 
greater. 
  Each of these constraints on the ideational change required to politicise the EU seems 
deserving of closer attention, together with others one might mention.
17
  If some of these equally 
raise questions for democracy at the national level, this should serve to remind how the experiences 
of the two are entwined.  As a fledgling polity, and one whose sustained viability requires new bonds 
of attachment to develop, the challenges facing the EU are more pronounced.  But they need not be 
seen as peculiar to the one type of polity, for they are challenges for political association more 
generally. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
As several EU scholars have come to note, political adversarialism concerning the ends of policy-
making is arguably a crucial part of democratic life, one that may serve not only the normatively 
desirable purpose of giving expression to the political grievances of citizens but which may 
additionally serve a polity-building role.  It helps to bind citizens to their political institutions, and to 
create bonds of principle between themselves and sub-groups of their fellow citizens.  While conflict 
over substantive ends may sometimes spill into conflict over procedures also, the chances of a full 
rejection of the polity are probably diminished if there exists the possibility to contest its policies 
rather than the necessity of accepting them wholesale.  Organised political conflict is likely to be a 
necessary condition of any satisfactory consolidation of the EU.  Yet political conflict which fails to 
resonate beyond the confines of an institutional setting can hardly perform this role.  The activities 
of political representatives need to correspond to the inclinations of citizens more widely, not so 
much in the eyes of the detached political observer who charts an overlap in the preference-
structures of the two, but in the eyes of protagonists themselves.  Moreover, a sense of popular 
involvement in the political struggles played out at a European level is unlikely to emerge 
spontaneously based on a recognition of self-evident interests, but instead will need fostering by 
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 Such lines of investigation may be given further contextual sensitivity by examining how language and imagery are 
developed differently for different audiences, or are distributed unevenly across positions in socio-economic and 
organisational space – central concerns of pragmatic and structuralist sociology respectively.  Exploration of such 
variations might be coupled with study of the destabilising effects of contradiction.  (For a recent study of class 
variations, see Fligstein 2008.) 
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those political actors which choose to exercise their capacity for reinterpreting the social and 
political world and to expand their political struggles to a transnational level. 
  Bringing certain sociological ideas to bear on the politicisation problematic promises to 
enrich the conceptualisation of this process.  It allows one to elaborate a perspective faithful both to 
the inescapable element of creativity and will that characterises political action, and to the 
constraints imposed by the actor’s embeddedness in a certain ideational setting.  Further, it enables 
one to conceptualise how the perspectives of ordinary citizens may relate to those of their most 
politically-engaged peers without evoking the somewhat determinist tones of cleavage theory.  
Drawing on empirical methods related to these approaches, one can trace how certain ideational 
features in particular may undermine the extent to which politicisation takes place, and explore how 
the variety of factors combine in the specificity of a given historical moment. 
  It may be that sociologists too can derive some benefit from this encounter with the 
concerns of another discipline.  There is a sense in which anyone engaged in social theory is at once 
doing political theory at the same time, since where the social theorist sketches the boundaries of 
order and contingency is where they set the limits to the exercise of political initiative.  The EU case 
generally is a stimulating one for sociology, as it forces a reappraisal of some of its most basic 
concepts – ‘society’ most notably – and their conventional association with the nation-state.  The 
matter of the EU’s democratisation through politicisation has the potential to be interesting in a 
further way, as it raises the question whether this reappraisal can be combined with an opening to 
political-theoretical concerns.  For those sociological approaches most receptive to this challenge, it 
offers a context in which they may be developed and refined.  
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